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Abstract 
 
The recent Global financial crisis has marked an unprecedented separation between finance 
and real economy. This paper deals with the question of today’s transition within finance 
geography. It focuses on the transition process of the Swiss financial system after 2008 from 
institutional and territorial perspective. More specifically, this study investigates new 
investment circuits in Switzerland and attempts to understand to which extent they are 
connected to entrepreneurial activities at local and regional levels. Our main findings 
highlight that the Swiss case shows two opposite movements: “from the top”, i.e. Swiss 
pension fund sector and “from below”, i.e. regional private entrepreneurial investors. We will 
finally demonstrate that, because of the specific institutional framework, the current transition 
process in Switzerland is more likely to be driven by small regional actors, rather than by 
large institutional investors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis with its disastrous economic and social consequences has taken 
root in unprecedented separation between the autonomized financial markets and the real 
economy (Corpataux et al., 2009). According to the Regulation Theory (Aglietta, 2010; Boyer, 
2004a, 2011), this crisis is systemic and could mark the end of the financialized regime of 
accumulation. The end of the regime implies a period of transition based on new forms of 
regulation that could lead to rethink the relationship between finance and real economy on 
ethic (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007) and economic principles. From the territorial point of 
view, the reconfiguration of the financial system should allow a re-articulation of the capital 
flows moving up from the "Global city" financial concentration (Sassen, 2005) to “new” 
local/regional accumulation systems (Crevoisier et al., 2011). 
 
This paper deals with the question of today’s transition within finance geography. In the first 
part of the article, we will show that regulationist scholars’ reflections are made at the 
macro-institutional and economic level. However, if this theory is much useful to think and 
describe the (long) period of accumulation and the subsequent crisis which puts an end to it, 
it provides no explanation of a new regime emergence. 
For instance, during the transition between the Fordist regime and the financialized one, 
other theories emerged in order to explain how, in a context of crisis of the most prevalent 
institutions, new innovative values, behaviours, products, techniques and economic 
systems developed. These theories were focusing on micro or “meso” experiences, mostly 
linked to regional dynamics. “Endogenous development”, innovative milieus, industrial 
districts, and finally the “cluster” approach were all trying to catch innovative behaviours on 
the field and developed more or less elaborated frameworks of understanding. 
This paper adopts a similar research hypothesis. A territorial and institutionalist approach is 
used in order to identify today’s attempts to rebuild connections between savings (monetary 
capital) and innovative projects in the real economy at different territorial levels. Transition 
“from the top” is understood as the changes induced by the largest financial players (big 
banks, institutional investors, large industrial companies, regulation authorities). Transition 
“from below” is developing in a much more decentralised way, among players who can no 
longer rely on existing routines for investing and undertaking new economic activities.  
In this context, the second part of the paper focuses on the transition process of the Swiss 
financial system after 2008. It appears that the today Swiss financial system is characterized 
by a “paralysis” among the largest players. It seems to be the result of a deep crisis of 
confidence in financial markets with a desire to preserve the wealth value. Indeed, 
investment strategies of Swiss pension funds appeared close to being quite immovable. 
Besides an ongoing increase in real estate investment, yet restricted by physical limits and 
too high prices of the Swiss market, investor’s predilection for liquid assets remains 
dominant, to the expense of direct investments, such as Venture Capital. We will explain the 
present pension fund’s investment model by a specific institutional-conventional 
architecture which determines that another way to invest is not currently possible. 
Furthermore, we argue that the emergence of new initiatives "from below", on local and 
regional levels, observed during empirical study, indicates a revival of interest for investing 
in real entrepreneurial projects with an increasing role of proximity in its geographical, but 
also cognitive, social and institutional meaning.  
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In conclusion, we will suggest that the observed profusion of “from below” financial circuits 
has not yet provoked any obvious reaction on the part of institutional investors. Indeed, 
embedded in a strict institutional framework, the pension funds investment model seems to 
be changing very slowly. This fact could explain separate territorial dynamics "from the top" 
and "from below" with only some occasional re-connections between them. 
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1.  A TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO THE POST CRISIS 
TRANSITION 
  
Do we have theories to understand why the market and capitalist economy periodically 
encounters periods of growth, of crisis, of transition, and of growth again? Of course, Marx 
explained quite well why capitalism is never quiet, why it needs continuous accumulation, 
and why, at a certain moment, the crisis becomes necessary in order to reestablish the rate 
of profit.  
 
Combining the Marxian, the institutionalist and the postkeynesian heritages, the Regulation 
Theory emerged in the seventies. It explicitly aimed at understanding why, after a relatively 
long period of stable growth, a crisis occured. Moreover, it tried to understand why those 
periods of stability and of crisis took specific shapes at different historical periods and in 
various countries. Its focal empirical field was the crisis which developed from 1974 onwards, 
entitled later “crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation”. 
 
This part describes first the theoretical tools that can be mobilized in order to understand 
transitions (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Second it provides a schematic view 
of how to deal with the current transition in geography of finance and more specifically by 
adopting a territorial approach. It also shows the importance of undertaking an exploratory 
research to identify features of the current transition (Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable.). 
 
1.1  Transition between accumulation regimes  
Schematically, the Regulation Theory argues that periods of stable growth are possible in 
capitalist economies because of systems of institutions, related to money, wages, 
competition, the role of the State and the international economic insertion which absorb the 
tensions created by the accumulation of capital. The crisis happens when those systems do 
no longer manage to contain those tensions (Boyer, 2004a).  
 
For Marx, as well as for the postkeynesians like Minsky (1992), the crisis devaluates the 
value of capital, and this simple fact opens the way for a new accumulation cycle. Probably 
this view is too simple. Regulationists make the distinction between crises “in the regime” and 
crises “of the regime”. For instance, the crises of 1987, 1992 and even 2001 can be seen as 
those “in the regime”, in the sense that the main institutions, like the central role played by 
financial markets in the process of capital accumulation, stood up to the stock market crash 
(see Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). On the contrary, the crises of 1974 and 2008 
are considered as crises “of the regime”, because the main institutions became no longer 
performing. 
 
In such fundamental crises, there is a need not only to restart the accumulation process, but 
to rebuild an entire institutional system. In this paper, we shall consider such a process as a 
transition. A long period is probably needed for a transition. Moreover, to rebuild an 
institutional system means to find new legitimating values. For Boltansky and Chiappello 
(2007), the great force of capitalism was always to be able, during those transition periods, to 
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listen to the critiques in order to rebuild an institutional system. Finding some convergence in 
the society around some values and inventing the corresponding institutions also probably 
takes time. 
Regarding transition, the Regulation Theory never provided any framework of understanding. 
What are the theories which could be mobilized? The concept of “transition” was mainly 
developed by a vast amount of literature about Central and Eastern European countries 
shifting from socialist to private property capitalist systems. The interesting point in those 
works is that transition seemed to be a too complex problem to give birth to any integrated 
and coherent theory, or framework of understanding. Transition had structural dimensions, 
with changes in monetary, property and other main institutions (Boyer, 2004a). It had flow 
dimensions, because migrants, investments, goods… flew massively in uncontrolled 
directions, causing all kinds of economic and social disequilibria and forcing political 
decisions. Transition had also an entrepreneurial and innovative dimension, asking for new 
economic forms, systems and modes of interaction. Combining structural features, flows 
disequilibria and innovation dynamics is a too complex problem to be handled by a single 
theory (Gern, 1995).  
 
In this paper, we shall also focus on another set of works which was developed in order to 
deal with regions in crisis during the transition period between the “Fordist accumulation 
regime” from 1945 to 1975 and the “financialized accumulation regime” which can be situated 
between 1985 and 2008. These so called Territorial Innovation Models (TIMs) (Lagendijk, 
2006; Moulaert and Sekia, 2003; Simmie, 2005) have several features in common. First, and 
most importantly, they change the spatial scale at which the main dynamics take place. An 
accumulation regime, by definition, encompasses the largest players, the most structuring 
institutions, the biggest economic and social powers, and aims at a worldwide expansion. 
The TIMs focused radically on regions in crisis (regions with an old industrial tradition) and 
developing regions (Italian industrial districts, high tech regions) (Benko and Dunford, 1991). 
Regions, not nations nor companies, are the competitive entities. Second, while not ignoring 
large companies, TIMs were focusing on SME1 networks and innovative milieus with strong 
entrepreneurial values.  
 
More than markets or hierarchies, mixes of cooperation and competition, of monetary and of 
non-monetary relations are seen as the basis for interactions. This important set of works 
showed, at various degrees, how the process of economic change and innovation is possible 
in an evolutionary and institutionalist perspective (Martin, 2010), i.e. how embedded actors 
are able to deal with and reframe the institutional settings which could lead to economic and 
institutional innovation and change. Whereas originally focused on describing relations and 
institutional settings of actors in one region, various scholars emphasized the necessity of 
seeing contemporary regional development as a network of interconnected relations with 
other regions (Bathelt et al., 2004; Lagendijk, 2006). Becoming more opened, the dynamics 
of regional development takes the form of multi-local connections (Jeannerat and Crevoisier, 
2011) within value chains and networks increasingly organized at a global scale (Coe et al., 
2008; 2004; Dicken, 2001; Henderson et al., 2002).  
 
1.2  Transition out of the financial accumulation regime?  
                                                
1 Small and medium enterprises (SME) 
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Whereas geography of finance is still an underdeveloped field within economic geography, 
French (2011) recently reasserted the importance of considering the financialization as “the 
growing influence of financial markets over the unfolding of economy, polity and society” 
(p.1). 
Until now finance geography (Clark and Wojcik, 2007; Dupuy and Lavigne, 2009) has dealt 
with the various roles of space in the functioning of financial markets. By showing the spatial 
embeddedness of financial markets, either in spatial selectivity of the investments (Corpataux 
et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2005; Pike, 2006), investors geography (Wójcik, 2007), spatial 
organization of financial places (Derruder et al., 2006; Sainteville, 2009) or even 
financialization of real estate (Theurillat et al., 2010), of infrastructures (Torrance, 2009) or of 
the property debt of households (Aalbers, 2009), scholars in finance geography highlighted 
the connections between spaces resulting from the development of a financial system 
organized at an international scale around the « Global City » (Sassen, 1991, 2010).  
 
However, the geography of finance still lacks a more conceptual and comprehensive 
framework (Engelen, 2008; French, 2011). For some scholars, to explain the contemporary 
spatial features in economic geography, the concept of financialization needs to be built upon 
Regulation theorists and more specifically by using the key concept of Financial 
accumulation regime (Engelen et al., 2010; Zeller, 2008a; 2008b). For others, like Dixon 
(2011), the concept of “variegation” coming from institutionalist/structuralist geographers like 
Tickell (2007) and Peck (2007) has to be used. Compared to the methodological nationalism 
of regulationist approach in political economy, addressing the issue of varieties of national 
capitalisms (Albert, 1991; Amable, 2005; Boyer, 2004b; Hall and Sosckice, 2001), economic 
geographers rather focus on the scale imbrications and linkages, from local to global, and on 
institutional varieties from one country or region/city to another.  
 
This paper follows the reflections about having a more conceptual and institutional framework 
in geography of finance. In the context of a deep economic crisis affecting now most of 
developed countries, the suggested analytical framework raises more specifically the 
question of the current transition process from a financialized accumulation regime to another 
one whose features are still unknown.  
 
This paper is firstly based on Regulationist scholars that put financial markets at the heart of 
the financialized accumulation regime, started since the end of 1980ies and organized at 
international level (Figure 1). At the same time, we adopt the analytical and methodological 
point of view of territorial economists (see Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.) who 
have considered the role of money and finance in regional development issues (Corpataux et 
al., 2009; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997; Martin and Minns, 1995; Theurillat, 2011). Therefore, to 
deal with the ongoing changes, we state the hypothesis that two opposite and 
complementary movements are simultaneously at work: a transition from the top and a 
transition from below (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Large players, national 
states and international organizations will be opposed to networks of regional players.  
  
 
The Post Crisis Transition: Toward New Investment Circuits ? 
7 
Figure 1 : Two sets of literature to address the issue of the current transition process 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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link between investors and firms could notify the beginning of a new era of capitalism, the 
“cognitive capitalism” (Colletis, 2008; Moulier Boutang, 2008; Paulré, 2008; Vercellone, 
2008). Indeed, a new kind of relationship between finance and knowledge could stay at the 
heart of a new era of capital accumulation based upon a cognitive and intellectual dimension 
of labor and where the main issue of the valorization of capital and property would focus on 
the transformation of knowledge into a commodity (Vercellone, 2008). However, we can ask 
if the non-use of exit by investors does not simply mean the end of financial markets - as they 
are based upon liquidity? 
 
The current crisis has also revealed a contestation of the values legitimating the regime 
(Boyer, 2011; Lordon, 2008b; Orléan, 2011). The financial industry is aware of the current 
volatility of the financial markets as well as of recurrent critiques regarding the lack of long 
term investments (Aglietta, 2008; Dembinski, 2008) or the lack of taking into account the 
social and environmental criteria (Jackson, 2011; Perez, 2013). For some (Demaria, 2004), 
the revival and the development of new sustainability funds (together with the ESG1 initiatives) 
can re-legitimate the role of the finance industry and, at a macro-level, lead to a new 
accumulation phase. Whether the “green deal”, based on the values of responsibility, has the 
capacity to play that role is an open question. 
 
In our view the post-crisis and current situation means the rebuilding of new investment 
circuits. The crisis raises questions about alternative connections between the real and 
financial spheres of the economy. Besides initiatives “from the top”, either coming from 
institutional investors and big financial institutions (like sustainable finance), some new 
initiatives “from below”, i.e. from SMEs, such as regional funds, business angels or new 
forms of proximity capital, are being currently observed. 
 
The main hypothesis of this research suggests that there exist new circuits, and that the 
identification of those circuits will provide critical advanced signals about the investment 
system, about the players and the values, about the territorial shapes (temporalities and 
spatialities) of a possibly emerging new regime of accumulation. On the methodological level, 
we consequently elaborated an exploratory case study research to identify emerging 
initiatives and new circuits between the financial and real spheres of the economy. 
 
  
                                                
1 Environmental, social and governance 
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Figure 2 : Transition to a new accumulation regime, views from the top and from    
below 
Financialised
regime
A	  future
regime?
Transition	  
« from the	  top»:	  
Key	  role of	  institutionnel	  
investors and	  big banks
Transition	  
«from below»:
Key	  role of	  local	  entrepreneurs	  
and	  «small»	  financing institutions	  
Basel	  agreements
Sustainable finance
…
« Moralisation »	  of	  finance
and	  cognitive	  capitalism
…
Business	  angels
Regional investment funds
Proximity capital
Endogenous development
Innovative milieux
Regional
system
Globalized
system
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
2. SWISS CASE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE CURRENT 
TRANSITION SITUATION  
Some new connections between finance capital and real economy needs will be illustrated by 
the Swiss context. First, to investigate the investment strategies of institutional investors, we 
conducted twelve qualitative interviews (Annexe 1) with various stakeholders from the Swiss 
pension funds sector: pension funds managers, investment advisers and financial institutions 
managers. This first gives a view “from the top” (2.1). Second, we performed six case studies 
of investment circuits “from below”, that is to say, from the point of view of direct investment 
actors. Thus, we have interviewed different local and regional actors, both private and public, 
such as private and public Venture Capital fund managers, Business Angels, intermediary 
platform funders, start-up creators, small businessmen, etc. (2.2). The collected data were 
cross-checked with various documentary sources and official statistics. 
 
2.1  Swiss pension funds’ investment strategies: view from the “top”  
The Swiss pension funds are good example, amongst other institutional investors such as 
insurances and banks, to show the massive investment strategy “from the top”, through 
financial markets investment vehicles and products. Furthermore, these investors gained a 
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very powerful position in financial sphere and, with a total asset of 750 billion in 2012 
(Swisscanto, 2012), have the real ability to affect financial and real economic activities. 
 
Indeed, from the middle of 1980ies to the beginning of the 2000ies, the investment strategy 
of pension funds totally changed together with the change of the legal-institutional framework 
(Corpataux et al., 2009). Dominant traditional investments such as direct property holdings, 
loans granted to employers (who are members of the fund) and mortgages were replaced by 
more liquid assets such as shares and bonds. This search for liquidity together with the 
diversification of investment, also through alternative financial assets such as Private equity 
or Hedge funds, has continued during the 2010 decade.  
 
The main problem currently faced by Pension funds is the underperformance or the extreme 
volatility of financial markets, together with current very low bonds rates (like Swiss state 
bonds rate at 0.46% on 10 years). This tricky situation means paradoxically for some, mostly 
public pension funds, being in under-covered situation, while still having massive capital to 
be invested. The main hypothesis guiding interviews was that pension funds would search for 
alternative investments to financial market ones. In other words, in order to preserve the 
asset value, pension funds would be the first to be interested in diversifying investment more 
directly in the economy, and more specifically at the regional/national scales, either by 
increasing investment in Venture Capital and Private Equity or through innovative financial 
products, such as new funds or direct property holdings in SMEs. This latter would mean a 
(more) long term investment and a new management role in SMEs (start-ups and more 
mature ones). 
 
However, in spite of financial market asset fluctuation, pension funds have not changed their 
investment strategy yet as they are still having massive investments in liquid but currently low 
performing assets (Graph 1). How to explain this paradoxical situation? 
 
Graph 1 : Asset allocation of Swiss pension funds from 2004 to 2011 (%) 
 
+ 
Source: Swiss pension funds 2012, the annual study carried out by Swisscanto 
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We argue that the situation of “immobilism and paralysis” may be explained by the 
institutional and conventional management framework. Firstly, this refers to the current 
management practices, based on the portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959), that consists in 
diversifying investments1 (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Moreover, it seems that 
over the last few years, pension funds have entered into a capital protection phase. It means 
that since the 2008 crisis, the main strategy is no longer to make the largest profits but to 
manage risks. For pension fund managers, this refers not only to the risk of loss of capital but 
also to protect themselves from risks to the institution’s reputation and to the management’s 
own personal responsibility.  
 
Secondly, the current situation has even driven pension funds to be more distrustful with any 
kind of potentially better connection with real economy. Despite some new – but rather 
limited in score – financial products, we can observe that what we call traditional alternative 
investment such as Private Equity or Venture Capital are not considered to be credible 
solutions to pension funds to fulfill security and return criteria (Erreur ! Source du renvoi 
introuvable.). 
 
Thirdly, we explain that alternative investments and potentially better connection with the 
needs of the “real” economy means a change of the management framework which goes 
together with new entrepreneurial competencies and new tools to assess the value of the 
unlisted firms (0). 
 
2.1.1  Funds management practices: the risk of reputation and the dictatorship of the 
market index 
The protection of capital and risk diminution implies also being aware of the risk of reputation 
and what we call the dictatorship of the market index. In fact, when investing in financial 
markets shares and products, pension funds mainly focus on big caps. 
 
According to some of our interviewees in pension fund investment consultancy, the funds 
tend, on the Swiss Stock Exchange, to increasingly skew their portfolios in favor of large 
groups such as Nestlé, Novartis, Roche and UBS, whilst ensuring that they have exactly the 
same companies in their portfolio as other pension funds. Small caps companies are often 
deliberately ignored as they represent a higher risk to the pension funds’ reputations, 
particularly those of public pension funds. Because of transparency requirements, the small 
caps owner (>5%), i.e. a pension fund, is announced to the Stock Exchange. As a small 
company is less mature, less experienced, it may fluctuate a lot more on the Stock Market 
than a big company. So, every time the small caps shares may drop, the fund and its 
managers will be publicly criticized. That is why, the risk to their reputation, and not just that 
of financial loss, dictates the preference for large caps over smaller companies.  
 
Furthermore, investment in big caps is closely related to the market index. The benchmarking 
practice has been fully integrated in pension funds investment strategies. This involves 
constantly comparing own portfolio fluctuation to a stock price index made up entirely of large 
caps. The index is calculated in such a way that the bigger the share value is, the more 
                                                
1Investments are evaluated upon two criteria which lead to an immediate mathematical comparison of 
risk and return factors of various financial assets (companies securities, debt securities, money assets, 
commodities, etc.) 
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weight it carries in the index. The funds therefore invest in large value shares to follow the 
index. The same index logic can also be observed in bonds indices which are based on the 
quantity of debt incurred by a country or a company. Unsurprisingly, we find in these indices 
lots of American, Japanese and European debt. Such investment behavior reveals the 
current politico-institutional context where the funds' managers would rather follow the index 
to be in line with other funds, in order to cover themselves against critics and reputational risk, 
even in the event of poor performance. In other words, the today Swiss pension fund 
investment strategy involves passively relying on Financial Markets system, accepting to lose 
money together with other pension funds, instead of trying some alternative investment 
strategy with an active management approach.  
 
In addition, financial intermediaries and consultancies in charge of pension funds capital 
allocation are not willing to change the current investment strategies through financial 
markets. In fact, according to the recent report of Federal office of social insurances1, the 
fees taken off the pension funds’ capital by banks and others intermediaries represent about 
0.56% of all allocations, i.e. 4.2 billion of Swiss francs2. In this context, it is clear that 
numerous financial institutions, competing with each other for pension funds money, are not 
encouraged to suggest any alternative investment solutions. 
 
Finally, we can observe that the legal and institutional investment guidelines have not 
changed to encourage investment in new assets. Several of our interviewees believed that 
both public and private pension funds are highly dependent on the system. They are, so to 
speak, boxed into a regulatory political framework which issues recommendations and gives 
directions to be followed. This framework, which includes, amongst others, the Swiss federal 
authorities, politicians, the media, etc. can also put the pressure on in the case of practices or 
initiatives which do not “comply” with established social and political ways of doing. In short, 
at present there are no “signals” from the political authorities regarding alternative 
investments.  
 
2.1.2  Old and new alternative investments in financial products : not suitable for pension 
funds  
Increasing pension funds investment in real estate, especially by purchasing and owning 
directly buildings, can be observed in the recent years. This more direct link with real estate 
is not new and corresponds to traditional investment strategies used by Swiss pension funds 
(Theurillat, 2010; Theurillat et al., 2010). The proportion of real estate in Swiss pension fund 
portfolios is constantly increasing: 20.7% in 2011, as compared with 17.1% in 2007 
(Swisscanto, 2012). This trend is due to the fact, that real estate, mainly direct3, is viewed as 
a way of protection against the volatility of market financial assets, despite rising prices, 
particularly in cities of international significance such as Geneva, Lausanne and Zurich.  
 
                                                
1 Frais de gestion de la fortune dans le 2e pilier, Rapport de recherche n° 3/11, Office fédéral des 
assurances sociales (http://www.rts.ch/emissions/temps-
present/4884038.html/BINARY/frais%20de%20gestion.pdf) 
2 The total amount of Swiss pension funds investment capital was about 750 billion in 2012. 
3 There are also indirect real estate investments through financial institutions, mainly real estate funds 
and real estate investment trusts, but this represent less than 20% of real estate investment (Theurillat, 
2010). 
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With reference to real estate increase in mind, we would firstly expect that Swiss pension 
funds could apply the same strategies by investing in unlisted SMEs. They indeed could use 
existing Private Equity or Venture Capital funds or be involved in setting up innovative circuits 
to invest in SMEs mainly for the same diversifying and preserving of value reasons. However, 
with reference to the interview data, we can observe, that since 2008 pension funds have not 
increased their investment in unlisted SMEs. We can even remark the opposite trend.  
 
Today, traditional actors of direct investment in Switzerland, such as Venture Capital and 
Private Equity funds, are being stalled and struggle to raise new funds within institutional 
investors. According to Swiss Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI, 2011)1, the 
Venture Capital in Switzerland shows a worrying decline of about 60% since last five years. 
While the number of transactions is being dropped, the investment periods tend to become 
longer (7 years instead of 4-5) and the capital gain smaller. This situation may seem 
paradoxical, since, in Switzerland, there is a surplus of capital compared with a small number 
of PE and VC financial companies (SECO, 2012). According to the State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs (SECO, 2012), this trend may be explained by a double trend. First, 
Venture Capital companies tend to invest more in later stage firms, because the risk is than 
lower and the minimum capital gain expectation is higher. Second, foreign Venture Capital 
funds have showed a net influx with about 30% of investments, generally in case of sale 
trade operations.  
 
As shown in the graph 2, Venture Capital investments in early-stage start-ups dropped by 
more than 50% going from €161 billion in 2011 to € 73 billion in 2012. In contrast, “later 
stage” participations grew by more than 50% in 2012 reaching €77 billion compared to €34 
billion in 2011.  
 
Graph 2: Venture Capital Investment Stage focus 
 
Source: SECA Yearbook 2013  
                                                
1 CTI Activity report 2011 
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According to the data from our interviews with intermediaries bringing together investors and 
entrepreneurs, Venture Capital funds are suffering since few years because, under the 
pressure of investors, they continue to process their investments from the perspective of high 
and quick benefits, within 5 years, exit. In fact, only 10-20% of SMEs meet the conditions of 
high annual benefit of 15%. Such benefit expectation means that a small firm must double its 
size within 5 years. These rapid growth strategies often imply sacrificing internal investments 
and work conditions. Criticized in the media and disapproved by public opinion, such 
investment approach is seen as destroying economic value of enterprises, and is therefore 
difficult to promote within long term institutional investors like Swiss pension funds.  
 
2.1.3 Alternative investments: the need of new management model and new tools to 
assess the value of firms   
Thirdly, we argue that alternative investment in a closer relationship with real economy would 
need a new management model. For the time being, there is very little room for manoeuvre 
for pension fund managers in terms of investment strategy. Working within the confines of a 
fairly conservative political and institutional framework, fund managers do not seem keen to 
involve themselves in alternative or innovative products by fear of criticism and retribution. 
The “flagship” strategy which is supposed to reduce risk to reputation and personal 
responsibility turns out to do exactly what the other pension funds are doing, namely do not 
take any initiative and await the clear “signals” to be beamed out from the public authorities. 
 
Thus, not willing to invest “alternatively”, the funds fall back on asset management selection 
strategies and cost reduction. Indeed, pension funds are currently focusing of having a more 
active control of management costs. In reality, long disappointed by the banks’ event-driven 
approach, the funds entrust mandates more and more cautiously and keep a close eye on 
their agents’ work. Moreover, the big funds (over CHF 1bln) are increasingly employing 
internal management teams in order to minimise discrepancies in information and prevent 
conflicts of interest. As for the banks’ commission rates, the funds feel increasingly able to 
negotiate lower basis points. Since the financial crisis and the implementation of the Basel II 
and III regulations, the banks are increasingly redirecting their income towards wealth 
management and are ready to sacrifice (a little of) their profits to keep hold of their customers.  
 
However, alternative investment means to go beyond costs control of delegated asset 
management or increasing internal asset management. What we call a new management 
model goes together with having new competencies to assess the economic value of firms. It 
appears that those leading the pension funds are not entrepreneurs. They are often either 
former accountants who have gradually climbed the corporate ladder or portfolio managers 
coming from banks or financial institutions. Their job consists in assessing the financial value 
of various products which is given by the rates on financial markets. To invest in a more 
direct way in the economy, and more specifically in SMEs, it means to have some experience 
in industry management. A first solution could be the hiring of PE or VC funds managers. 
This would give pension funds some more entrepreneurial competencies. However, as we 
have seen (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.), investment in what we have called 
traditional PE and VC funds have limits even leading to destruction of value due to high 
return expectation on a relative short term.  
 
In this vein, we argue that alternative investment means above all a different and specific 
assessment of the real economic and financial value of firms. The economic value on 
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financial markets has indeed its own mimetic logic (Orléan, 2011) that differs from the real 
one. Prices on financial markets depend on investor’s beliefs and behaviour. The question of 
economic value and valuation of firm is at the core of a new conventional and institutional 
management framework (0). The implementation of new criteria and tools providing 
qualitative as well as quantitative information about the assessment of firms is a tricky 
question. It is however the only way to make more direct and long term investment in firms 
possible, and at a macro level, to have a better connection from the main actors of financial 
capital to the needs of the economy. 
 
In brief, we can say that the absence of new investment circuits from the top is due to the 
overarching institutional-conventional framework that pension funds are currently following. 
This framework is based on the financial notions of yield, risk and liquidity (Corpataux et al., 
2009) and implies a current paradoxical situation between, on the one hand, the needs of 
massive and diversified investments and, on the other hand, the lack of alternative 
investment strategies from pension funds managers.  
 
2.2 Current initiatives from below: toward what kind of 
entrepreneurship?  
Although pension funds are spurning “real” investment solutions, the Swiss unlisted SME 
market has had a new lease of life. Unlike the “top-down” channels stymied by institutional 
constraints, new “bottom-up” channels are currently being created (Appleyard, 2013). In 
accordance with the main argument of this paper, it seems that currently private rather than 
institutional investors are most actively exploiting this new niche. According to the data 
gathered in interviews, the number of private investors who are investing, or would like to 
invest directly in Swiss start-ups and SMEs has mushroomed over the last five years. The 
question is thus to see, if these new initiatives imply the rebuilding of the investment 
channels which link national savings with the real economy. 
 
In fact, the proximity capital (Crevoisier, 1998) is being reshaping today with the arrival of 
new kind of private investors, disappointed by financial markets instability and willing to have 
more control over their savings. First of all, the new population of private investors is quite 
heterogeneous as for their profit expectations and investment approaches (2.2.1). Second, 
this direct investment market is concentrated on early-stage Swiss start-ups and traditional 
SMEs, given up by Venture Capital and Private Equity funds (2.2.2). Third, investment 
channels from below are built like professional and interpersonal networks, gathering around 
new actors: intermediary platforms where entrepreneurs and investors can meet and 
collaborate (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.). Finally, in those specific markets, the 
geographical proximity is essential. However, the geographical proximity between regional 
firms and regional investors tends to become more open. Today, we can observe clear 
initiatives for transforming these regional decentralized markets into a centralized one based 
on multi-local, national and international networks connecting firms and investors (0). 
 
2.2.1 Private investors and their financial / non-financial objectives  
Conforming to our survey data, the population of private individual investors has changed 
since 2008. Before, they were essentially Business Angels, that is to say former 
entrepreneurs who gained a lot of money with their own business and now wish to help 
young start-up creators with financing and access to their professional networks. 
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These private investors of « new » kind could be divided in four groups. The first group 
includes private financial investors who were disappointed by financial markets and are 
looking for an alternative source of benefit. According to a recent report of State Secretariate 
for Economic Affairs (SECO, 2012), 30% of private investors currently fall into this category. 
While being close to Venture capitalists in terms of capital gain expectation of above 10%, 
they can invest only their own savings and dispose therefore of smaller amounts unlike VC 
funds investing institutional investor’s capital.  
 
In the second group, we can find former high level managers from big companies looking 
for a new job. Their main objective is to provide themselves with as manager position or 
within the Board of directors by buying a small firm. While being important, the investment 
benefits are secondary, behind the social recognition which goes together with career 
situation. 
 
The third group investors comprises “early retired” persons who are less than 60 years old. 
They are former managers or former entrepreneurs who wish to remain in active life by doing 
business. Unlike the second group, these investors are not looking for a job, buy wish instead 
to help young entrepreneurs by sharing their experience and theirs address books. As 
specified by one of Swiss Business Angels club members, these investors accept to follow 
voluntarily the small firm during several years of investment period in exchange for a 
reasonable profit of 3-7%, after the firm is sold to some big company. 
 
Finally, the forth group gathers together foreign extra-European investors wishing to invest 
above $1 mln in Swiss small businesses in exchange for residence permit in Switzerland. For 
instance, in the case of Club of Business Angels of Valais, the number of these investors has 
strongly increased during these last years.  
 
2.2.2 Investment objects: early stage start-ups and traditional SME’s deserted by PE 
& VC actors  
Currently, most of direct investments undertaken by private individual investors in 
Switzerland are being focused on innovative early stage start-ups and traditional SMEs 
looking for handover capital. 
 
First, the « solid » start-ups which are not « high flyers »1 are being deserted by Venture 
Capital companies. While giving priority to more important investments, above $ 1 mln, VC 
funds opt for later stages aiming at quicker exit with higher capital gain. Therefore, in spite of 
leadership in innovation and competitiveness, many Swiss technological start-ups are 
suffering from financing “bottleneck”, especially those on early stage of development (SECA, 
2013; SECO, 2012). 
 
Second, a lot of traditional SMEs looking for handover capital are also experiencing financing 
difficulties, but due to different reasons. Unlike the start-up creators, “naturally” used to 
search for money, traditional SMEs directors would feel uncomfortable when forced to 
                                                
1 The "high flyers" start-ups show a very high obvious potential to be rapidly bought by some big 
companies such as Novartis or Nestlé. Therefore, they have better financing opportunities than other 
« solid », but less promising start-ups. 
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approach potential investors, thus admitting their financial problems. At present, the Swiss 
market of handover investment is still being a “hidden” and underexploited market. Since 
considering this market as strongly promising, some investment intermediaries or 
matchmakers (Bessy and Chauvin, 2013), interviewed under the present study, are being 
implemented new strategies in order to capitalize on it. For example, the founder of Geneva 
Single Portal intermediary platform highlighted the importance of changing general investors’ 
and entrepreneurs’ attitude by creating and broadcasting a more positive image of company 
transmission business. 
 
2.2.3 Intermediary platforms: bringing together investors and SME’s  
In this context of increasing demand from private investors, new intermediary actors have 
recently appeared as well. Their main role is to link up together individual investors and 
entrepreneurs looking for start (seed), growth or handover capital. While offering a range of 
services to guide the individual investors through the "hidden" market of SMEs, they 
contribute to reduce the risk-factor and to improve the matching likelihood between investors 
and entrepreneurs expectations. Six case studies have been conducted to investigate the 
intermediary’s special features and working methods within French- and German speaking 
regions of Switzerland. In fact, these various intermediary actors show, at the same time, 
common and heterogeneous characteristics as for their origin, working methods, investors, 
target SMEs, services for investors, as well as spatialities of intermediation activities (see 
Table 1). 
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Table 1: Current features of the financial circuits « from below » 
 
Source : own elaboration 
Capital Proximité1 is an Intermediary Platform created in 1995 by public authorities of five 
French-speaking cantons and State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO2). Since 2008, 
the number of private investors registered on this platform has been multiplied by 6.5 (from 
180 to 1200). The vast majority of these new investors are former managers looking for a 
new job (about 60%). The SMEs searching for financing are located in French-speaking 
Switzerland (about 250) and mainly belong to traditional sector of industry. 
 
                                                
1 Proximity Capital (own translation from French) 
2 http://www.seco.admin.ch/index.html?lang=en 
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The Business Angels Club of Valais was created in 2003 by the Center of Financial 
Competences of the Canton of Valais (CCF). Originally intended to foreign investors looking 
for residence permit in Switzerland, the club counts now among its members also local and 
from neighbor countries private investors. To be eligible for investment, the start-ups must be 
innovative and be located in the region of Valais.  
 
The Club of Swiss Business Angels (BAS) includes two sections: French- and German-
speaking. The French-speaking section, explored for this study, was created in 2007. During 
these last years, the club has been joined by several investors of new kind – early retired 
managers or former entrepreneurs. Geographically, the club activities are concentrated on 
regional scale. The physical proximity between private investors and small businesses is 
essential for successful value assessment and follow-up process.  
 
Single Portal in Geneva is a very new initiative aiming at creating a single meeting place for 
private investors and SMEs from Geneva region. The special feature of this platform is the 
will to legitimate it by introducing representatives of Management associations and those of 
the Chamber of fiduciaries and tax lowers. According to the platform founder, the presence of 
these legitimating partners would help investors and entrepreneurs to feel more secure, since 
ensuring the Privacy of each participant. 
 
Go-Beyond intermediary platform was created in 2010. Located in Zurich and Geneva, it is 
intended to individual private investors who wish to invest directly in early stage start-ups. 
Aiming at improving matching chances between investors and entrepreneur’s expectations, 
this platform provides its members with a range of services, such as learning seminars, 
group and split investment, start-up value benchmarking, etc. Geographically, the platform 
looks for extending investment activities abroad for both, investors and small firms. 
 
Investire.ch, created in 2012 and located in Zurich and Zug, is the biggest intermediary 
investment platform specialized in direct investment in Swiss start-ups. Its business model 
allows private individual investors to invest together with more professional investors like 
Venture capitalists or banks. This company has no geographical constraints and accepts 
national, but also European investors and start-ups. 
 
While being heterogeneous as for investors and companies’ characteristics, all these 
intermediary platforms have common working methods. In addition to Internet web-site, 
regular events are organized to bring together investors and SMEs. In these meetings, new 
start-ups are directly introduced to potential investors. While taking the decision to invest or 
not, the investors can benefit from direct interaction with entrepreneurs and from intermediate 
feedback from other investors (Ibert, 2007). Thus reducing the information asymmetry, the 
real meetings help also to establish mutual trust through the presence of various legitimating 
actors (Jeannerat, 2012).  
 
When speaking about direct investment process, the task of start-ups value assessment and 
follow-up is a tricky question, especially for not very experienced private investors. 
Consequently, all these intermediaries strive to provide the investors with various services 
helping to reduce risks and to get a better understanding of the investment process. Apart 
from in deep Due diligence, they offer the possibility to co-invest with other private investors 
in the same small firm and to divide the whole amount into several small investments in 
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different start-ups. In addition, most of these platforms organize learning seminars aiming at 
enhancing investor’s value assessment and management skills. 
 
2.2.4 « New proximity capital» spatialities: from local to multi-local and multi-scalar 
networks?  
Today, we can observe the multiplication of Intermediary Platforms either at a local/cantonal 
level or at a regional one (French-speaking or German-speaking region). The platforms are 
indeed marketplaces based on specific local geographical features. Firstly, investment is 
clearly based on the co-presence between investors and firms. When not working in the firm, 
investors must indeed know well the daily life of the firm by taking part in the weekly 
meetings (work meetings and board councils) or by discussing with the company manager. 
The original principle for these specific direct investments is the following: local-based 
investors – which includes in some cases Swiss nationals coming from other regions and 
foreigners having a residential address in the Canton (Business Angels du Valais) – invest in 
local-based SMEs. 
 
However, the original geographical proximity between firms and investors tends to reach 
some limits. Many of these recently created decentralized marketplaces are currently 
confronted with a limited number of “solid start-up” and SMEs to invest in. This is particularly 
the case for platforms situated in non-urban Canton such as Capital Proximité and Business 
Angels from Valais. For those situated in core urban regions like Zurich and Lausanne-
Geneva, such as BAS, Porte Unique or Go-beyond, the number of SMEs is potentially higher. 
Despite these regional investment differences, it was said that the future for these 
decentralized markets is to develop a common data base of firms to have a larger investment 
scope for investors. In other words, the next step is to create a centralized market – a unique 
platform – by putting together the multi-local networks of firms that already contain, for some 
platforms, firms in neighbor countries (Investiere.ch). The change of scale by the creation of 
a more centralized market also means to open the scope of investors (Go-beyond and 
Investiere.ch are emblematic examples). The sharing of transparent information enables 
potentially longer-distance as well as other private investors, such as professional or 
institutional investors, to invest in Swiss SMEs. 
 
These change of scale and of business models raise two main questions. On the one hand, it 
means to rethink the co-presence between investors and firms. On the other hand, and more 
fundamentally, it means to deal with the economic value of firms and the financial return for 
investors. If the mainly local individual investors can have low yield expectation or even only 
extra-financial expectation towards SMEs investment, a change of scale goes together with a 
change of investors profile and expectations. The new intermediary actors may therefore play 
an important role in developing a new valuation frame (Bessy and Chauvin, 2013) by 
enabling individual and professional investors with new tools and categories to go through 
investment process from initial evaluation towards final valorization of a small company.  
 
The future development of these new experimentations of allocation between capital and 
firms remains an open question. On the one hand, if we see a generalization or 
industrialization process of new forms of direct investment, this can only go together with the 
development of new criteria and tools to assess the specific economic value of each firm and 
the real expected return – which follows the specific growth of the firms – for investor based 
on a long-term implication in firms. On the other hand, the market centralization and 
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industrialization process can lead to the development of new forms of financial markets, 
following the example of PE and VC funds, where the question of degree of liquidity or of exit 
– exchange of SMEs parts/shares – is crucial. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The main theoretical as well as very practical and social issue in this article is to develop an 
understanding of the current period we have lived from the financial and economic crisis of 
2008. Our reflections are based on Regulationist scholars for whom the crisis of 2008 is 
considered – questioned – as a crisis of the financialized accumulation regime that has 
developed from 1980ies. This theory in particular, as other theories, doesn’t however tell us 
how to consider transition periods and especially with the issue of identifying a new regime 
with his macro-institutional architecture.  
 
In this article, we are stressing to use a very practical and exploratory approach, based on a 
case study in the Swiss context, to deal with the relationships between the financial and real 
spheres of the economy. The financialized accumulation regime implied the submission of 
the real economy to the evaluation and control of the financial markets and a very specific 
geographical features: on the one hand, it means the governance of the industrial production 
regions by financial centers, and one the other, financialization means the continuing 
geographical and sectoral expansion of finance in order to enable the accumulation process 
within financial markets. However, and this is at the same time our starting hypothesis, we 
are currently living some new experiences of investing – and of new potential connections 
between the financial and real spheres of the economy – as the main institution of the regime, 
i.e. financial markets, are underperforming or very volatile. Consequently, this situation 
implies some new investment strategies or at least some reactions from investors. 
 
The Swiss case shows two opposite movements. We can observe a certain institutional and 
conventional “immobilism” from what we call the “top”. Despite having massive funds to be 
invested and with the exception of real estate, Swiss pension funds are not truly involved in 
new investment initiatives. Due to the focus on risk prevention, it seems to be difficult to 
escape from liquid financial assets and from the congruent financial benchmarks. Thus, this 
study highlights a lack of professional investors willing to invest directly in SMEs at medium 
and long term. Traditional Venture Capital funds do not play this role any more.  
 
We can however behold various initiatives of new investments from what we call “below”. 
This refers to private investors that have been actively searching for new, totally independent 
of financial markets, investment opportunities. These initiatives have in common to be based 
on new networks or business introduction platforms. In fact, new intermediary actors have 
recently emerged and contribute to create a new Swiss direct investment market by building 
alternative investment circuits. It appears that these intermediary platforms play a mixed role 
by fulfilling various functions: legitimation, evaluation, development of specific skills aiming at 
enabling private individual investors, experienced or not, to address the uncertainty while 
investing directly in start-ups and SMEs. The main issue here is to put investors and 
enterprises – mainly SMEs – in relation, which also means a more active investor’s role in 
the SMEs (as a member of the board company and / or as a manager). For the time being, 
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these different initiatives are still in an experimental phase, developing rapidly though, and 
haven’t provoked yet any obvious reaction on behalf of pension funds or other institutional 
investors. 
 
The Swiss case shows indeed two totally separated dynamics, one from the top and the 
other from below. However, if the Swiss case is an opportunity to observe ongoing processes, 
by identifying some new connections between money and enterprises, it doesn’t allow us to 
go beyond the hypothetical research question of a new regime of accumulation. The 
institutional as well as territorial features of the current transition period and the one of a new 
accumulation regime are still an open research question! 
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